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During the last decade, evidence collected
in cognitive, developmental, and compar-
ative research showed that adults pre-
vented from verbal counting, along with
infants and non-human animals possess
numerical systems that are independent
of language (the so-called “non-verbal
numerical abilities”). Interestingly very
similar results were reported among mam-
mals, birds, and fish, leading some authors
to believe in the existence of the same
numerical systems shared among verte-
brates (Feigenson et al., 2004; Beran, 2008;
Agrillo et al., 2012). However, the exact
nature of these capacities is unknown and
it is currently unclear whether or not the
similar performance described in the liter-
ature is the result of a common origin of
cognitive skills, or instead reflects indepen-
dent convergent evolutions.
Some of these comparative studies have
recently received a lot ofmedia coverage, as
they suggested that numerical discrimina-
tion is not only a vertebrates’ prerogative.
Bees, for instance, proved able to reach
a food reward, apparently by enumerat-
ing the landmarks encountered sequen-
tially during flight (Dacke and Srinivasan,
2008); bees can also make use of num-
bers in a sequential matching-to-sample
task (Gross et al., 2009). Ants report-
edly pass numerical information to other
ants when transferring information about
which branch of a maze contains food
(Reznikova and Ryabko, 2011) and spiders
(Nelson and Jackson, 2012) are believed to
base their settling decisions in nest selec-
tion on the number of already settled con-
specifics, preferring to join nests where
only one conspecific is present (instead of
0, 2, or 3 conspecifics).
The idea that organisms with such
a small brain size can somehow pro-
cess numerical information has opened a
wide debate in the scientific community
as to whether these studies have prop-
erly controlled for non-numerical contin-
uous variables that co-vary with numbers
(i.e., cumulative surface area, density,
overall space occupied by the groups, etc.).
After all, the potential implications of
these works could not be underestimated
by neuroscientists: the very idea that
higher-level cortical mechanisms are a sine
qua non condition for number processing
is at risk. The study by Stoianov and Zorzi
(2012), which is based on computational
models, has now provided a potential
explanation for the astonishing numerical
abilities of invertebrates. The authors used
deep networks; that is, a multilayer neural
system that shares top-down and bottom-
up connections to infer perceptions of
the sensory input. The study investigated
sensitivity to numerical information in
terms of internal coding by hidden neu-
rons after learning (the network had one
visible layer encoding sensory data and two
hidden layers hierarchically organized).
The results showed that highest-level pop-
ulations of as few as 35 hidden neu-
rons were able to support the process of
numerosity estimation. This implies that
numerosity might be potentially extracted
with the use of a very limited number
of neurons, definitively far fewer neurons
than was previously thought (Dehaene
and Changeux, 1993). It is important to
note that the response of hidden neu-
rons was not initially stipulated; just
the opposite, it represented an unsu-
pervised emergent property. Stimuli—
patterns representing objects differing in
numerosity—were strictly controlled for
non-numerical continuous quantities that
co-vary with numbers (such as cumula-
tive surface area, shape, size, and density of
the objects), thus preventing the possibil-
ity that results were due to a more general
ability to estimate continuous amounts.
Even more remarkably, the model’s deep-
est layer proved to be able to support
human-like performance, as the inter-
nal Weber fraction in relative numerosity
judgments strictly resembled that com-
monly observed in humans.
The idea that numerosity estimation
can spontaneously emerge as a statistical
property aligns with a previous study on
adult humans which suggests that the abil-
ity to estimate the number of items might
be a sort of primary visual property of
stimuli, such as color and contrast, that
is based on a low-level mechanism (Burr
and Ross, 2008). Above all, the conclusions
of Stoianov and Zorzi (2012) are in line
with a recent theoretical view that empha-
sizes the importance of neural circuits,
rather than the size of brain regions that
are supposed to modulate higher cognitive
functions (Chittka and Niven, 2009).
These results may also have implica-
tions in the theoretical debate that sur-
rounds non-verbal estimation of other
magnitudes, such as time and space.
According to Walsh (2003), time, space,
and number would be processed by a
common magnitude system (a theory
of magnitude which is commonly called
“ATOM”) that is mainly located in the
parietal lobe. The theory has been pri-
marily investigated by using either con-
trast paradigms (Agrillo et al., 2010)
or the observation of neuro-anatomical
correlates (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008).
Computational models could provide use-
ful insights as well. Indeed, one poten-
tial prediction of ATOM would be that,
just as emergent numerosity detectors are
now recognized, emergent space, and time
detectors should be reported. In addition,
if there is a common system, then the same
number of neurons should be required to
process the three magnitudes. Any signif-
icant difference would suggest at least a
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partial independence in processing these
magnitudes.
Of course, the model created by
Stoianov and Zorzi (2012) also needs to
be tested in a wider range of contexts.
In their research, stimuli consisted of
30× 30 pixel images that contained from
1 to 32 rectangular figures. None of the
figures overlapped each other, and they
were all separated by at least one pixel.
However, in everyday life—for instance,
when we have to select a queue that con-
tains the least amount of people—stimuli
can move incessantly in a tridimensional
space, modifying their inter-individual
distance or changing orientation and,
hence, the visible area. They can also par-
tially to totally occlude each other. The
numerosity estimation of natural stimuli
might be processed by a larger neural net-
work than that suggested by the authors. In
line with this argumentation, neuroimag-
ing studies support the idea that humans
recruit distinct brain areas that involve,
but are not limited to, inferior parietal
regions to estimate numerosity (for meta-
analysis, see Arsalidou and Taylor, 2011).
It is worth noting that the model presented
only a 30× 30 pixel resolution, and that
numerosity detection is primarily based
on a signal from center-surround neu-
rons that are described in the early visual
system. The possibility remains that the
quantity of numerosity detectors might
increase while increasing the visual resolu-
tion of the model. From a theoretical point
of view, it is possible that organisms that
have a small brain size and reduced visual
resolution might be properly equipped
with the few numerosity detectors which
were described in Stoianov and Zorzi’s
study (2012), while humans and other
species that have better visual resolution
might display more numerosity detectors.
Future studies are required in order to test
this hypothesis. In this sense, the model
that is described in their paper might be
considered a very useful formal model
of human abstract numerosity estima-
tion that captures key elements—namely,
center-surround filtering and normal-
ization with global visual properties of
human numerosity estimation. However,
some details need to be further clarified
with respect to the visual processes that
are involved in numerosity estimation.
One thing is certain: the study by
Stoianov and Zorzi (2012) now paves the
way for further investigation into the com-
putational bases of numerosity estimation
within non-human animals. Specific deep
networks might be set up according to the
peculiarities of different species (i.e., that
take into account the different number
of sensory and internal neurons), help-
ing us to shed light on the true nature of
the similar performance reported in the
literature: similar results with respect to
the computational bases would support
the “common origin” hypothesis of non-
verbal numerical abilities, while the oppo-
site pattern of data would support rather
the “convergent evolution” hypothesis.
We can only speculate about this lat-
ter point, but at least the lesson we can
currently draw is clear: 35 units can spon-
taneously learn how to extract numerical
information. This is enough even for sim-
pler organisms than those reported in the
literature. The last decade of comparative
psychology was characterized by the dis-
covery of numerical abilities in almost all
vertebrate species. In light of the conclu-
sions of Stoianov and Zorzi (2012), we
must now expect the coming decade to
be epitomized by a wide-scale invasion of
invertebrates into the numerical cognition
literature.
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